He also wanted to punish Shona cattle thieves. The vengeance spread and other Shona, who had been working for white farmers, were killed or ran away. Possibly Shona were hacked to death by the Ndebele, under the walls of Fort Victoria, frightening the whites with visible barbarism. There was minor damage to white property. Lendy then shot thirty Ndebele, who had offered no resistance.
Lobengula had taken care to avoid conflict with the whites in the Shona areas, though he still wanted tribute and his suzerainty recognised. He was worried that the company would use any excuse to invade Matabeleland.
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The Chartered Company put a force of 1, troops in the field in three columns, supported by African wagon drivers. It was all over quickly. An explosion and fire destroyed Gubulawayo, and Rhodes established a new town 3 miles away. Lobengula died shortly after. The value of company shares soared in London. But the cruelty of the new order, with dispossession of African cattle and land, and an iron fist, could not be denied. Forced labour, taxation and terrible revenge against any threat to white control were intrinsic to the occupation. For example, in the British South Africa Company police arrived at the Methodist mission farm at Zvimba, not far from the Jesuit mission where Robert Mugabe would be born some thirty years later.
The police flogged three men in front of their families, took seven chiefs hostage and shot four of them dead. When two Methodist missionaries complained to the acting administrator, a Mr Duncan, they told him that anywhere else this would have been called murder. He replied that it was necessary to establish law and maintain order.
In the towns of the Cape, Rhodes was promoting segregation. But Rhodes, the visionary imperialist, was also a high-stakes gambler. At the end of he promoted the ill-starred Jameson Raid into the Transvaal, the independent Boer republic, which nearly brought down both his Chartered Company and his private territory of Rhodesia.
Many British officials, including Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, were complicit in the plot. Jameson and his men suffered losses, were rounded up by the Boers, and handed over to the British for punishment in England. Disastrously for Rhodes, who had lost his Afrikaner support in the Cape and was temporarily demoralised, it opened up the prospect of a successful African rebellion in Rhodesia.
There were only forty-eight white police in the whole of Matabeleland, and the Ndebele impis remustered and gathered hidden weapons. The news that Jameson and his white police had surrendered to the Boers triggered an Ndebele rebellion on 20 March It was led by prominent indunas, priests of the Mwari cult, and a former Ndebele slave named Mkwati. Nyamanda, eldest son of Lobengula, also took a commanding role. Around whites, and a similar number of black servants, were hacked to death. But by the end of May, Bulawayo had been relieved. Contrary to the company line that the Shona had been rescued from subservience to the Ndebele, this rebellion was followed, in June, by a Shona uprising also; over a hundred settlers were killed in the first few days, and survivors retreated to Fort Salisbury.
Paramount chiefs and spirit mediums inspired the Shona, although some Shona stayed neutral or even collaborated with the whites. But grievances were many, including white demands for forced labour and the sexual demands of young white men, who hugely outnumbered white women in the early stages of the colony.
The Ndebele, armed with modern weapons and with their military tradition, were the most feared. Their lands had been occupied according to alien European ideas of property, they had been subject to forced labour, a hut tax to push them into the money economy, and most of their prized cattle had been stolen. Rhodes, who had just got back from London after trying to dissipate the political damage of the Jameson Raid, made himself a colonel and led a relieving column. But crucially he was supported by imperial troops, and crucially the Ndebele did not coordinate with the Shona.
Rhodes demanded utter ruthlessness in pursuing the Ndebele in what turned into a guerrilla war. He generated propaganda about African barbarism in London. The Ndebele defended a succession of hills, first the Mambos, then the Matopos, and Frederick Carrington, the imperial commander, sought to starve out the Ndebele troops in the Matopos. Kraals were burnt and food stocks destroyed, in a foretaste of techniques that the British would use against the Boers not long after. But Rhodes, who had to overcome his own lack of personal courage, was moved by the deaths of the white soldiers.
He underwent an epiphany. At considerable personal risk he negotiated a series of peace agreements with the Ndebele indunas in August, offering to reform the police and reduce the exactions of his administration. Indeed Baden-Powell appears to have broken the laws of war in executing a rebel, Uwini, who had surrendered on a promise that his life would be spared. It made possible the withdrawal of the troops sooner rather than later, sparing British government expense, and permitting the company to retain its control through the British South African Police.
But the Shona war went on for another year. Rhodes, who had always taken the Ndebele more seriously as a military threat, was not personally involved. He led no peacemaking indabas, or consultations, with the Shona leaders. Shona people were gunned down. When they hid in caves, the caves were dynamited. There were hundreds of punitive expeditions across the country. The sheer horror of these revenge missions was illustrated by what happened at a Shona village called Shaungwe, on the top of a steep hill nearly metres high. It had never been captured by the Ndebele, but the British cut off its water supply and set up machine-gun posts on all the slopes.
They waited until thirst and hunger forced surrender, but 90 men were killed in a breakout where others got away, and when women surrendered after a long siege they showed a stoical composure in sipping from their first calabash of water. A committee of inquiry in London on the Raid became a whitewash, in which Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, combined to defend each other. Rhodes was seen by many, both in Britain and in English South Africa, as a hero who had saved Rhodesia for the Empire.
He saw out the first phase of the war in besieged Kimberley, where he undermined and tried to take over from the British commander, Colonel Robert Kekewich. Rhodes died at his home near Cape Town, in March , of heart failure. The war by then had moved into its final guerrilla phase. He wanted to see telegraph lines and a railway linking the Cape to Cairo. He had famously told Queen Victoria, who asked him what he had been up to lately, that he had added two provinces what became Southern and Northern Rhodesia to her dominions. But in the chessboard of African imperialism he, and his Chartered Company, had not had it all their own way.
Bechuanaland and Nyasaland had escaped his clutches, remaining protected by the Colonial Office. But in a sense the territory was contingent. It happened to be north of the Limpopo. What was certain for him was that geography required its occupation by whites for the purposes of his vision, just as the African inhabitants were either an obstacle or a cheap labour force. And his vision, at the acme of imperial ambition, was stupendous.
As a year-old he had envisaged a secret society which would promote British rule throughout the world. Dying under the age of 50, he left much of his fortune to endow scholarships to his old university, Oxford, to spread British values in a more acceptable fashion. But what was the nature of the white settlement in what is now Zimbabwe in the last decade of the nineteenth century? Frederick Selous, who was a guide to the expedition, was given 21, acres in Mashonaland by Rhodes, as an inducement.
Recruits for the war against Lobengula in were offered 6, acres to farm, twenty gold claims, and a share of looted cattle. In Rhodes gave Alfred de Fonseca 33, acres of Ndebele land, and he awarded Cape MPs tracts of land in Rhodesia as freely as he gave them shares in his Chartered Company, to buy support.
By , Land was given out to syndicates, and to young aristocrats, who in many cases had neither the desire nor the skill to master agriculture and overcome bush, rinderpest, malaria, locusts and drought. There were therefore distinctions, of class and money, among the early settlers. Many were adventurers of the kind who had flocked to Kimberley in the diamond rush, and to the Rand in the gold rush, young men on the make, sometimes with dubious backgrounds.
Few had the patience or experience for agriculture. Yet they were not experienced prospectors, and they lacked the equipment to dig deep even where there were signs of gold-bearing rocks. Heavy rains, lasting for five months in , bogged down the pioneers and were followed by mosquitoes, malaria and fever. Many died. Little gold was found, and in a mining expert named John Hammond told Rhodes that more was unlikely. They dismissed the idea that earlier Shona had been responsible for the architectural wonders of Great Zimbabwe.
They did not appreciate that pre-colonial societies were full of complexity. There was also a bias in favour of the Ndebele, seen as having a warlike character, similar to that of the respected Zulus. The early settlers were ambivalent about his Chartered Company, which was seen as doing more for its shareholders in Britain and Europe than for those suffering hardships on the ground.
Until the railway came up to Bulawayo ordinary imported necessities seemed very dear. And, until nearly the end of the nineteenth century, the white settlers remained fearful of insurrection, ambush or murder from the conquered blacks. Seen from the African viewpoint, it was a tale of unmitigated dispossession. The cattle, symbol of wealth for the Ndebele especially, were taken from them.
An alien approach to land ownership was foisted on them. As late as , during the Lancaster House negotiations for an independent Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo was moved to tears in recalling how his mother had been pushed off her land. The best grazing was now in the hands of the Europeans. Critics noted that the reserves were sandy, poorly watered and in unpromising locations. Yet, while the Ndebele and Shona were no longer free to roam wherever they pleased, many of the properties so flippantly distributed by Rhodes and the Chartered Company were not being actively farmed.
The company had monopoly powers. It was both a capitalist and an imperialist enterprise. When it was financially weak, Rhodes would back it with his De Beers shares. When he and his friends won a war, the value of its stocks in London would rise. But not all its shareholders were British; late in life, after the siege of Kimberley had been raised in the Anglo-Boer War and Rhodes was criticised for a speech, he defended himself by arguing that it was designed for his French shareholders. His threat of an early UDI, the unilateral declaration of independence actually carried out by the Smith regime in the s, was essentially hollow.
Empire-building in central and southern Africa was a vulnerable task, with Boers, Germans, Portuguese and Ndebele to contend with; the British South Africa Company needed backup, which only the British government could provide. When the machinations of Rhodes finally brought all-out war with the Boer republics, only the massive imperial army of Lord Roberts, with about 40, men and a hundred artillery guns, could rescue his dreams. Of course South Africa, in its modern sense, did not exist. There was the Cape Colony, the conquered Zulu territory, the two Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State and, rather to one side in the west, the Bechuanaland protectorate.
However, the existence of the Boer republics, and the fact that Bechuanaland was not under the Cape or the Chartered Company, meant that Rhodesia had a certain geographical independence. It could not easily be swallowed up by the Cape. But the format was different. Rhodesia might be a tribute to the imperial idea, and the triumph of a particular imperialist, but it was also a somewhat independent fact in the congeries of southern African statelets and ethnicities.
Two aspects of the conquest era also cast a long shadow. Whereas African disputes had been settled by assegais and knobkerries, the Europeans introduced the latest, most destructive equipment in modern warfare — heavy guns, machine guns and rifles. Death and threats of violence became an underlying discourse between Europeans and Africans, overlaying the periodic violence in relations between African groups. Neither Lobengula with his slaves, nor the Shona paramount chiefs, had been running liberal democracies. But the new arrivals claimed to stand for a civilising mission, as well as personal enrichment.
Only a handful of missionaries and others could see that their cruelty was an affront to Christianity and peacemaking. More important was the federation of the South African territories into the Union of South Africa in But this did not include the protectorates of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and the Sotho kingdom, and, although geopolitical strategists would already have liked to include Rhodesia, the anomaly of a company-run territory was an obstacle. The British Act which set up the Union of South Africa left open the possibility that Rhodesia might join as a fifth province.
A resident commissioner, paid for by the Colonial Office, was in charge of police and army, but did not have a staff. An administrator, responsible to the company, presided over an executive and a legislative council. Significantly, the settlers acquired an elected majority on the legislative council in This complex system represented a compromise between the Colonial Office the imperial factor , the company, white settlers, and a paternalistic gesture to limit the exploitation of conquered Africans.
The colony was short of capital. The company, after a visit by its deputation from London in , decided to give preference to agricultural development over mining, which increased the competition with Africans for land. In fact, after a disappointing start, Rhodesian gold mines had produced as much as , oz in , but the British victory in the South African war exposed them to stronger competition from the south.
Even in the s there had been occasional strikes by African miners. For the British government, this was a cost-saving measure. A protectorate arrangement under the Colonial Office, as occurred in neighbouring Bechuanaland or Nyasaland, became less likely as the white population rose. Land policy for the Africans was ambiguous. To begin with, the company sought to keep Africans on the white farms, where labour was badly needed, seeing the reserves as a temporary refuge for those who could not adjust to the European way of life.
The philosophy was assimilationist, portraying Africans as a potential proletariat. By the s the attitude to land was more clearly segregationist, and the reserves became the permanent share left to Africans.
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In the Legislative Council approved the Immorality Suppression Ordinance, which made extramarital sex between a black man and a white woman illegal. Pressure on Africans to earn money in the white economy was exercised through taxation, although African traders and individuals increasingly wanted access to European goods.
The missionaries, who had been in the country since before the conquest, but without much success in evangelism, hoped to win African souls after the defeat of their spirit mediums. They had a monopoly of African education until , and after that were running some of the most prestigious schools. Nonetheless the progress of Christianity was slow; in it was estimated that less than a tenth of the African population of around a million had been converted. It was a system destructive of family life and community traditions.
It was supported by the requirement, which was introduced prior to the rebellions, that men should carry passes to legitimise their movements. By each African man had to carry a registration certificate, and be ready to show it. Hence two features of the South African apartheid system, so much criticised as National Party racism after it was formalised after , were actually features of the Rhodesian colony over thirty years earlier. Whereas elsewhere in the African empire the British had operated by indirect rule, using the chiefly and traditional authorities to govern, in Rhodesia the native commissioners had direct power and the traditional chiefs were subordinated.
The native commissioners, keen to avoid the forced labour of the Jameson regime, faced criticism from white farmers who wanted more African workers at lower cost. The —18 war impacted sharply on Rhodesia. It created a boom for the agricultural and mineral commodities produced by the colony. It demonstrated that there was no new appetite for rebellion in the African population. It showed a patriotic loyalism in the white population. And it hastened the end of the rule by the Chartered Company. In spite of the shortage of capital, and the smallness of the white population — only 27, in total — the war showed that the colony had built a diversified economy in less than a quarter of a century.
As well as its farm products there were exports of coal, gold, copper, tungsten, chrome, zinc, antimony and asbestos. A high proportion of white males joined in the imperial armies which captured the German colonies. The authorities were sufficiently confident of African attitudes to recruit two Rhodesian Native Regiments, which fought under white officers in East Africa.
Just prior to the outbreak of the war an important dispute over land was referred to the judicial committee of the Privy Council. The case was brought by the Legislative Council, by now under settler control. This decision — which came after the death of Dr Jameson, who as president of the company represented continuity with the founder — helped bring the end of Chartered Company rule in Rhodesia. This left open the question, what next?
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The one option that was not on the agenda was rule by the Colonial Office, which could have led to a very different evolution for Southern Rhodesia in the twentieth century. It was not on the agenda for two reasons. Second, rule from Whitehall was likely to be more expensive for the British government. The debates around the constitutional future for Rhodesia exercised the white community; they virtually ignored the blacks. Nyamanda and the surviving upper-caste Ndebele pressed fruitlessly for a protectorate status for part of Matabeleland.
But they were ignored.
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The Africans were still recently conquered peoples, with little social intercourse with whites, and in no way regarded by them as partners or equals. The campaigners for responsible government were led by Charles Coghlan, a Bulawayo lawyer who had made his name by litigation for settlers against the Chartered Company. He was a Roman Catholic of Irish ancestry. On the other side were the richer, more respectable people in the colony, and its major institutions — including the company.
From his earlier incarnation as a Boer general in the Anglo-Boer War, he had become an advocate of reconciliation between Boers and Britons. He emerged from the First World War as a key imperial statesman, who had run the Germans out of their African colonies, and gone to the Versailles Peace Conference.
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His approach had something in common with Rhodes, in that he envisaged a white-ruled, self-governing nation, part of the British Empire, stretching up into the heart of Africa. In its linking of national security to such expansion, it also looked forward to the strategy of the apartheid South African state in the s and s, which sought a protective ring of vassals to its north. Smuts, although an Afrikaner himself, had low politics in mind. He hoped that the Rhodesians, overwhelmingly of British stock, would provide a vote bank for him in South Africa.
But the result of the referendum was decisive: while the unionists got 5, votes, the supporters of responsible government won 8, Out of an African population of nearly , only 60 were on the register; out of a European population of 35,, the register listed around 20, There were several causes for the unionist defeat, including a fear and dislike of Afrikaners, who were immigrating and taking low-paid white jobs. Violence in South Africa in , causing loss of life for both Africans and Europeans, made the country seem unsafe and unattractive to join.
Hence the years —23 were crucial in establishing the identity of Rhodesia as separate from its powerful neighbour. There were echoes of the Irish settlement in the same period. Northern Ireland was carved out of the Irish Free State as a Protestant-dominated statelet, where for many years the large Catholic minority was kept subordinate. But whereas London had granted authority to a majority in Northern Ireland, in Rhodesia this authority was given to a small minority in the population of the territory, with few real checks.
It was technically a Crown colony. But a convention developed under which the United Kingdom would never legislate for it except by agreement with or at the request of the Rhodesian government. The issue of land, in the s, continued to be a source of friction. Dr Jameson had been ruthless in reducing the amount and quality of soil available to both Ndebele and Shona, and this helped to explain the rebellions in the s; a decision in by Sir Richard Martin, the first resident commissioner, more than doubled the land set aside for the Ndebele, and increased the amount for the Shona.
Nonetheless the land available for Africans was only Throughout the First World War the Chartered Company had been wanting more agricultural land for the whites, and the Native Department sought to resist, especially in Matabeleland. Significantly, especially in Shona areas, there was an African boycott of work on white farms and altogether the proportion of indigenous farm labourers more than halved between and Furthermore, the changes would give the Africans land that was less fertile.
The issue was tackled again in when Sir Morris Carter, a former chief justice in Uganda and Tanganyika, reported on behalf of a Land Commission. It was not until a Land Apportionment Act was finally passed in April , with approval from the British government, that there was some degree of finality.
Leaving aside the tribal trust lands, for Africans not expected to be part of the European economy, 7. The whites persuaded themselves that this was a good deal for the Africans, and a Native Development Department was set up in to help Africans with agriculture and conservation.
But in fact the deal was massively disproportionate — with 28 million acres, including the reserves, set aside for 1 million Africans, and 48 million acres set aside for 50, whites. Furthermore the African birth rate rose faster than had been forecast, while significant land set aside for the Europeans was not being farmed. The impact on race relations was of course negative, especially as the towns began to grow. At a human level there were many Africans, like Joshua Nkomo, who carried around bitter memories of the loss of agricultural land.
Stan Mudenge, Zimbabwe foreign minister in the late s and early s, told a British high commissioner how his grandfather had shown him the place where the family had formerly farmed. This was partly a matter of trying to run a unified rail system in central Africa, and partly from a desire to acquire the newly discovered riches of the Copperbelt.
What this really meant was that there were not many whites living in the protectorate, compared with Southern Rhodesia where they had established their own power base. After Coghlan the key white politician was Godfrey Huggins, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia from to , and architect of the ill-fated Central African Federation. He was a doctor, born in Bexley, Kent, who arrived in the country in and practised as a surgeon, the first in Southern Rhodesia.
Huggins was deaf but sociable, a skilful manager of conservative instincts, who came to power with the support of a radically pro-white Reform Party and then created a winning coalition called the United Party. The racial radicals in the Reform Party were pushing for overt segregation and separate development, with removal of Africans from the common roll and protection for white artisans.
The pyramids would never be equal. Huggins was no ideologue. It rejected both the idea of sending brighter Africans to Northern Rhodesia for promotion to more senior posts, and the proposal that Africans be removed from the common roll of voters. This Act required firms in urban areas to pay the same wages to black as to white workers, which looked progressive to the Dominions Office. But in reality it had several consequences which damaged the prospects of African advancement. Second, because it did not define an African as an employee, he could not have trade-union rights.
Third, it left the African skilled worker to the ancient mercies of the Master and Servants Act, under which labour obduracy was met with criminal penalties. The total effect was to choke off the acquisition of higher skills at better wages for Africans, as well as the scope for African unionism. A Labour Party, representing the interests of white workers, was vigilant in preventing the progress of blacks. Social change for Africans threatened the authority of the chiefs and older generation, and in the s the white Native Commissioners sought to reconstruct a state-supported tribalism which had only a partial resemblance to Shona and Ndebele traditions.
The Native Department was split between those who wanted to encourage African individualism, often influenced by Christian values, and those who wanted to restore communal practices. The efforts of the Lobengula family to persuade Britain to assume direct responsibility, to recognise the chiefly status of his grandsons, and to restore unalienated land to their trusteeship for the Ndebele, were firmly resisted.
It actively encouraged white immigration, but white numbers were still pretty small, climbing from less than 35, in to 65, in ; although African numbers had risen relatively less, from around , to 1. Agricultural policy was sharply skewed in favour of white farmers rather than black, especially in prices for maize, the staple food crop for Africans. Although it had its ups and downs, tobacco farming took off, particularly in the Shona areas north and east of Salisbury.
Agriculture was dominated by big combines, and many small white farmers still lived close to the edge. Salisbury overtook Bulawayo in population and wealth. The economy depended largely on mining, with gold, asbestos and chrome the principal exports. In the two secretaries of state in London, for the dominions and for the colonies, set up a commission under a former governor general of New Zealand, Lord Bledisloe.
Its task was to review British policy in Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and to see whether there was a justified case for partial or total federation. The upshot, debated in the UK parliament in July , just prior to outbreak of the Second World War, was significant. In Southern Rhodesia the Africans were subordinate to the white settlers. Furthermore, in each territory, the Africans were opposed to mergers, which they could see would lead to an extension of Southern Rhodesian practices. Commissioners were struck by the ability of Africans, who largely lacked a formal Western education, to recognise and speak up for their interests.
Although the Bledisloe report could not lead to major institutional change, and got buried in the debris of war, it hinted at long-term issues of importance. Second, it showed that Huggins and establishment whites in Southern Rhodesia were keen to extend their sway northwards, in spite of the demographic obstacles; this was to lead to the ill-fated Central African Federation of — Third, it marked the start of an era when academics in Britain joined church people and left-wingers in anxiety about suppressing the African voice; by the s this informed opinion was strongly influencing the Labour Party, then in opposition in Britain, which in government had granted independence to India.
African organisations gained in strength in the s and s, as welfare societies lost ground to more militant bodies influenced by South African examples and the cut and thrust of industrial struggle.
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The combination of Christian and Africanist values in some of the leaders was epitomised by the career of Thompson Samkange, who had been born in as Mushore in the Chipata area of the Zvimba chieftaincy, not too far from the birthplace of Robert Mugabe in Kutama. Nonetheless, against family opposition, Mushore allowed himself to be baptised as Thompson and came under the influence of the outspoken pro-African missionary John White.
Thompson Samkange trained as a clergyman and teacher, was posted to the Wankie Colliery and learnt Ndebele in Bulawayo. In he was secretary to the first Missionary Conference of Christian Natives, when White was in the chair, and in Bulawayo was a mediator in clashes between Shona and Ndebele workers. Southern Rhodesia, as a Crown colony, entered the Second World War automatically in September ; South Africa, as an independent dominion, only joined in on the British side by a narrow parliamentary majority, due to anti-British and proGerman sentiment among Afrikaners.
All told some 8, white men and 1, white women served in the forces, with 14, Africans; white losses were significantly higher. Many white Rhodesians fought alongside South Africans, and were used to train Africans from other colonies. There was, however, a distinction between African recruitment in West Africa, never an attractive region for European settlers, and southern Africa. In the Gold Coast, which as Ghana was to become the first independent African state in the Commonwealth, as many as 65, Africans were allowed to join up and two were commissioned as officers.
However, inflation saw a rise of per cent in the cost of living between and , seriously outstripping the wages of most urban Africans. Growth of African populations in towns had led to overcrowding, slums and health problems; the government shelved plans to build a new clinic in the Bulawayo location in December The white population of around 65, in temporarily rose by 15, But the war effort was underpinned by black labour.
A Compulsory Native Labour Act, , made strikes dangerous, but they happened all the same, especially when the mealie meal ration was cut back. As in Britain and the United States, the war led to industrial interventionism and some slightly more liberal attitudes. There was even a white communist cell in Southern Rhodesia, which swept up the youthful Doris Lessing.
He nationalised the iron and steel works in Bulawayo, and in he bought Rhodesia Railways from the old Chartered Company, even though much of the network ran through Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Richard Bourne's well-written book on the background to what Zimbabwe has become is remarkable for its attention to detail on both people and events. It is historically comprehensive and gives readers a good understanding of the background issues which led to the subsequent failures and failings.
Many other lesser players feature, including a good number mainly black, who are not nearly so well known even in their own country. The book to my mind is not so strong in giving adequate weight to the importance of attitudes amongst both blacks and whites and particularly to how the latter's mindset and attitudes led first to the failure of the Central African Federation and then to the war of independence.
Prime Minister Garfield Todd and Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs who tried to swim against this tide and whose policies, had they been implemented, might have led to more peaceful outcomes get scant mention. By the same token there is the key importance of the hugely damaging minutiae of white racism including so call 'pinpricks' and the almost suicidal but often routine humiliation of blacks. We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form. If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item.
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