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Usually dispatched within 1 to 3 months. Perfect Paperback. Theory of Wages by Kurt W. Rothschild 1 Dec Go back to filtering menu. Tell us how we can improve our site If you need help, please visit the help section or contact us. Submit Please provide a reason:. This is only possible because the meaning of thick is intersubjectively fied. If the hearers view of the etralinguistic reality would determine their interpretation of thick, they would have to interpret the meaning of thick as thin, which is not the case. The hearers need not share the speaker s opinion, but they understand what the speaker means, as well as they understand the referee s decision of off side, even if they do not agree with him.

The only difference from common language is the fact that the referee classifies the game situation definitively as off side and thus assigns membership, like the judge in Aitchison s 58 eample of mad and bad. This difference, however, is not linguistic in nature, since it is the social authority conferred to the referee or the judge which turns the designation into a definitive classification, which is a first point to keep in mind for the analysis of official terminologies.

When we say terminology, our prototypical representation of this concept makes us think rather of terms whose function it is to name things Depecker 17, 20 than of theoretical concepts like polysemy, structure, system, etc. If a term is meant to be a name, then of course the problem of assigning membership arises, like in the judge s or referee s decision. The notion of name implies the assumption that there are objects to be named cf. Rey 21 But what is an object when there is fuzziness?

The general fact of etralinguistic fuzziness strongly contradicts the terminological assumption that concepts contain the shared features of the members of an etralinguistic class of objects cf. In fact it is not possible to separate concept from object cf. The very nature of concepts has to be intensional idealistic. And even the etralinguistic objects we believe to eist and we refer to by words are mentally codetermined when they emerge from fuzziness, like day and night. It is true that terminology implies a stronger effort to delimitate objects and classes referentially related to terms, but it is also true that the undertaking is a mere effort of normalization which will never be completely successful, ecept perhaps for some very artificial classes of objects, since there also eist efforts of etralinguistic normalization, e.

The eactness of terminology depends on the eactness of the special world a term refers to. In theory, categorical fuzziness need not appear in artificial worlds, since we can create delimited classes of objects, e. Theoretically, the world of human inventions, machines and other things would thus offer the same possibility. However, even technical in Hence the fuzziness problem will be almost the same in special language as in common language.

In the case of social sciences cf. Wright 18 19 , descriptive terminology has to deal with almost the same vagueness or diversity of concepts as common language. Table 1, taken from Code Like in the case of the referee s or judge s decision, the classification of each inhabitant of France is definitive and valid within the social authority concerned with national statistics, which means: It is not limited to utterance, but to a whole specialized domain cf.

Engberg This is what we generally find or what terminology tries to establish for special languages. According to the general fuzziness assumption for etralinguistic reality, and despite of using clear official rules for the attribution of each profession to overall categories, the fuzziness appears in certain categories which, apparently, serve to classify the rest. In the case of social statistics, some of these categories became quite famous because of their heterogeneity, e. This is the reason why Cognitive Linguistics considers words as instruments to accede to powerful networks of mentally related knowledge.

And this is also the reason why there has been a turn in linguistics of special languages from word based terminology to tet based analysis of specialized discourse. We only understand a specialized book on biology if we have a specialized knowledge. Similarly, translation only concerns the concrete use of signs in communication tet, discourse Albrecht , GerzymischArbogast 15 Translation requires knowledge of a whole special language, not only of isolated words Albrecht However, this point of view must not replace the terminological one, since the words of a tet are previously fied leical units which are specifically adapted to a tet.

Schaeder 18 argues that the communicational or pragmatic turn in terminology focusing on specialized communication tets must not withdraw the attention from leical terminology. In consequence, the tetbased and the wordbased perspectives are complementary.

The main problem is not the irrelevance of the general leicological or the corresponding special terminological point of view, but the tendency of general semantics to develop models which do not allow to describe eactly what happens when a word enters a tet cf. In Cognitive Linguistics, terms like frame and script related to a word are almost adequate linguistic ways to describe tetrelevant knowledge of the world from a leicological point of view. This is the reason why the definition of a specialized term goes hand in hand with specialized knowledge related to the thing meant encyclopedic knowledge.

The notions of frame and script are too rough for this purpose, since detailed knowledge of the structure and function of objects is required. Nevertheless, there is no fundamental difference in nature between common linguistic signs and terms, as wrongly claimed by Rey 18 , since each time we learn a new common word we also need encyclopedic information. We cannot learn a word like computer without learning something about the object concerned. In this sense, specialized language differs only by the profundity of knowledge from common language.

Of course, no clearcut distinction between core meaning and encyclopedic knowledge is possible. From a theoretical point of view, the structural tradition to separate intralinguistic meaning and etralinguistic encyclopedic information is misleading or misinterpreted. In fact, some linguists and terminologists tend to interpret this approach in a very material sense, as if linguistic features were something else in nature than encyclopedic features.

Geckeler and other structural semanticists, for instance, argued against Pottier s famous feature analysis of the leical field of seats in French that semantic features like four legs or back This analysis is completely wrong. If this was true, no concrete object could be designated by a meaningful word. Actually, what language does when it creates meaning is to take into account selectively certain etralinguistic features. This process might be called in German Versprachlichung, languaging cf.

In this sense, the structural assumption of intralinguistic features is right. They do not differ in nature from other features of our knowledge, but only by their function in linguistic communication, for instance, if a word presupposes a feature for designation.

In other words, when a meaning presupposes the feature four legs in the referential process, then the etralinguistic feature four legs has been integrated cognitively as semantic feature in our mental concept. This way, the concept has a mental reality on its own right.


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Accordingly we can accept the Saussurian point of view that language and of course meaning is different from the etralinguistic world. This implies that, vice versa, linguistics cannot eclude the notion of object from its discourse cf. Depecker 22 Of course, the integration of features in meaning is a gradual process.

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Some features may be obligatory, but others will be relevant in a statistical sense. Note that this cognitive effort of Versprachlichung is identical in nature with the effort of cognitive conceptual sharpening described in Section 1. In the social sciences, where artificially created new terms are often increasingly used in common language, and common language words are used for specialized purposes IhleSchmidt , at least some of the core features will be shared by both, the term and the common word.

I do not know a single theory which proceeds to a verification with a random sample of words. The common method is to look for eamples which illustrate the theory. From a methodological point of view, this technique is acceptable if one tries to formulate hypotheses, but inacceptable as a method of objective verification of the hypotheses. Furthermore, semantic theories usually are strongly opposed to each another, as if in other theories all was wrong.

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A good approach to a theoretical study like the present one seems to be to maintain what in each theory seems to hold against empirical data and serves to eplain linguistic communication on both the leical and the tet level. It will be shown that this attitude is far from being eclectic but rather corresponds to linguistic reality. I assume that meanings in language are as diverse as the objects they refer to. This eplains why each semantic theory finds words to which the theory applies. But how can we deal with diversity in a single coherent semantic theory?

A multidimensional theory of meaning linked with the possibility of selective communicative relevance in tets appears to be a good solution. A general theory of word meaning should display at least three main dimensions cf. Schema 1 : Morphosemantic information provided by word formation or polysemy; paradigmatic information on leical oppositions to other elements of the frame a word belongs to, referential information in the sense of Gestaltlike mental representations of the thing meant.

Every single word is characterized by a different weight of each dimension in its specific meaning. A word like big is characterized by a lack of morphosemantic information besides perhaps polysemy , a predominant influence of paradigmatic information opposition to small and eventually a slight influence of prototype, which may occasionally play a role, without being predominant, since big ant and small elephant are possible collocations. Morphosemantic dimension Paradigmatic dimension Referential dimension schema 1: The three main dimensions of leical meaning 5 The French common word and socioeconomic term cadre In the case of the French word cadre, used as a designation for the socioprofessional group of eecutives, all three dimensions are important cf.

This prototype is not only a neutral mental representation of an object, but an important model of individual identification to a social group. During the general social crisis concerning the definition of the cadres as a rising social group between and , a series of caricatures based on morphosemantic relations appeared, and most definitions of the social group focus on this morphosemantic feature Hummel a: 35 38, 42 The selective contetual relevance of morphosemantic information is more systematic in polysemous words like F. All these words have a first, morphologically motivated meaning.

The same holds for E. Arbeiter in cases like a good worker, a hard worker. I refer to this meaning as Meaning 1. When we ask speakers for the meaning of G. Arbeiter or E. This gives us three important insights. In leicalized words, morphosemantic features tend to be less conscious than paradigmatic and referential features. On the other hand, speakers are able to actualize them in case of need. Furthermore, the use of the words in the broad meaning delimited by morphology seems to be a rather spontaneous process.

Both questioning of informants and empirical analysis of contet coincide in this point. From the point of view of contrastive linguistics, this paradigmatic structure differs from the one in German cf. Angestellter that would allow a uniform translation independent from the contet for general aspects, cf.

Hohnhold a,b,c. Thus, a different weight of the dimensions of meaning is here the basis for leicalized polysemy.

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The same holds for G. Angestellter employed person Meaning 1 , white collar Meaning 2 , and also for E. Consequently, the different translations of these polysemous words may also be eplained by contetual relevance of one semantic dimension instead of the other cf. Of course, mental prototype is not the only way referential knowledge and eperiences are condensed in word meaning. There may be further knowledge of single objects, especially when the word is considered as a designation for a class of objects, for instance the knowledge about the classification of borderline cases like penguin for the class of birds or whale for the class of fish.

Furthermore, it follows that monodimensional semantic theories do not correspond to linguistic reality. Leical field theory, for instance, considers only the paradigmatic dimension. On the other hand, prototype theory underestimates the power of morphosemantic and paradigmatic information. Both theories fail when we try to give a coherent linguistic eplanation of the polysemy of words like F.

Angesteller and Arbeiter, since their polysemy consists simply in giving a selective weight to another dimension of meaning at the level of leicon. It is not surprising that the term dimension is used in recent terminological semantics Depecker But how do we conceive invariability in a tridimensional model of meaning? Is there necessarily a contradiction between invariability and contetual fleibility? On the level of leicon, all three dimensions contribute permanent features to what we call meaning or concept. At the level of utterance, however, the speaker has selective access to the dimensions of meaning when he speaks.

This can be shown by contet analysis and by effects on equivalence and translation. The contetual relevance of prototype appears in spontaneous synonymy of words like F. Another eample are Sp. In both cases, identity of prototype leads to spontaneous synonymy in spite of the clear differences in para The consequences of contetual relevance of the three dimensions on translation have been briefly discussed in Section 5.

Another eample is Baldinger s 37 semantic analysis of G. Angestellter and F. Baldinger considered them equivalent. This only holds for the morphosemantic dimension and mental prototype, whereas the words are clearly different with respect to the paradigmatic relations, for G. This is one of the reasons why leicological phenomena have to be observed in objective corpora in order to counterbalance introspective biases.

In our semantic theory, the term refers to the stable elements of several dimensions. This turns core meaning into a rather comple thing. Furthermore, this does not necessarily imply that all the components of core meaning have to be relevant in the same way, neither at the level of leicon, since the weight of each dimension is wordspecific, nor in contet, because not all core elements are relevant in each contet. In a certain sense, the elements represented in each dimension of cadre are invariable, since we can empirically prove that they belong to shared knowledge necessary for communication.

This, however, does not lead, in our theory, to a static understanding of what meaning is and how it functions in communication. This tridimensional and dynamic concept of core meaning does not eclude invariable features. Langacker s 28 profiling process, e. In consequence, the eclusion of invariable features from meaning cf. Section 1 is also a reductionist approach. In general terms, terminology is characterized by artificial options eecuted with a high degree of consciousness.

Terminology is more conscious, because the terminologist discusses openly the linking between word morphology, concept and object cf. The artificial options of terminology tend to reduce the comple tridimensional semantic configuration we may call concept to a definition cf. Depecker 17 which contains basically paradigmatic and, occasionally, morphosemantic features, but eclude prototype. This option seems to be meaningful, if the term is to be used uniformly with a clear underlying notion working independently from contet identity of terminological and contetual meaning.

This artificial intervention of terminology is displayed in the semiotic model of Suonuuti 9 , where definition adds a fourth side to the semiotic triangle. However, in some cases an option for prototype might be useful as well, e. The It follows that the semiotic effect of terminographic work is not limited to definition, as pointed out by Depecker 19 , but may also affect the morphosemantic dimension and the referential representation included in a concept. Depending on the function of the term, terminography tries to deepen the relevant dimensions of the concept and to establish coherence between the dimensions, avoiding misleading morphosemantic information, because morphosemantic transparency supports the understanding of newly coined terms.

Schmitt observed that all neologisms in the specialized discourse of economy in France are in fact motivated and transparent cf. Depecker 9, Some terminologies try to cover completely a whole field. Social statistics, for instance, aims at a coherent classification of a whole population in groups Section 2.

Paradigmatic oppositions will be prior to the other dimensions of meaning, e. At the same time, relational features will be more important than simple inherent features without distinctive force. On a more technical level, a detailed list of the objects included in and ecluded from the etralinguistic class social group , will be necessary, in order to handle the fuzziness of etralinguistic classes. This list suggests generally a hierarchy of groups, which may try to reflect as well as possible the one which predominates in the mind of the population itself cf.

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Schema 4. However, common language does not contain a complete and coherent classification system of this type for professional groups. Empirical contet analysis only allows to find out some important paradigmatic relations. By creating complete taonomies, social terminology reinforces and deepens these paradigmatic relations cf.

Budin , who insists on the organizational aspect of knowledge in specialized languages and its representation by linguistic signs. Cognitive Linguistics is right to postulate comple networks of knowledge which offer more types of relations than simple paradigmatic hierarchy.

Taonomies do not allow to reflect these networks of knowledge. But a good terminographic dictionary should be able to make crossreferences in order to construct an adequate representation of a special language s knowledge network as a sort The terminological frames and scripts obtained in this way might be a good base for cross references in the entries of a dictionary.

Nevertheless, I do not believe that our mind contains complete, preeisting networks of knowledge, since the effective relations between concepts are individually established in concrete thought and speech cf. The problem seems to be basically the same as in leical field theory: the words may be related, but it is hard to believe that they are definitively related in mind like in a leical field or a cognitive network.

The only real networks we have are tets and discourse, where linguistic items and knowledge are related in a creative way. All corpusbased leicological or terminological abstractions are simple intents to approach something like the most common network relations in language and knowledge.

This is of course an important and eciting terminographic task. But the result should not be as static as structuralism has come to be. The turnover from simple paradigmatic relations of the leical field type to the network concept of Cognitive Semantics frames, scripts is crucial for general semantic theory.

My initial proposals in Hummel a: have to be revised accordingly. We could even be tempted to argue that there is no reason to treat the three dimensions of meaning separately, but to conflate them in one network. Especially, we could think that there is no separation between the referential representation and the paradigmatic networks because of the contiguity we observe in etralinguistic structures.

This point of view is right, if we look at the etralinguistic situation disregarding linguistic reality, for instance, the etralinguistic fuzziness or contiguity between what is thick and what is thin. But if it is true what we have pointed out in Section 1, then there must be a cognitive effort to conceive the meaning of the words thick and thin and the reality they refer to as being not only different, but clearly opposed.

This forces us to assume that in linguistic meaning the mental representation of etralinguistic reality is thought to be different from the surrounding representations. Mental prototype is a good eample for this cognitive effort. If this is true, we have to separate, from a linguistic point of view, the referential dimension from the paradigmatic one, since this is eactly the function of a linguistic sign.

The simple fact that we tend to believe that words refer to objects different from other objects shows that this separation corresponds to our idealistic mental reality against etralinguistic contiguity. That is why I would like to maintain the term paradigmatic dimension. The morphosemantic dimension is clearly different in nature from the other dimensions because of its intralinguistic motivation.

The functional effects of different weight in the leicon and selective relevance in contet pointed out in the preceding sections give important additional evidence of this point of view. I would thus like to maintain the division of meaning in three dimensions. Semantic networks, as discussed in Cognitive Semantics, would then be limited to the paradigmatic dimension which treats the relationships between wordassociated concepts to other concepts.

Perhaps a pragmatic dimension should be added to the tridimensional model of meaning in order to give account of the communicational eperience associated with a word or term, e. Kader cf. Section 9. However, for the specific purpose of this paper, the three dimensions seem to be adequate for a rather comple description and eplanation of the main leicological and terminological problems treated. On the other hand, the impact of history on the meaning of words and terms cannot be neglected in a more general perspective, since a digital, cabled radio is not the same as a first generation radio Depecker 8.

The impact of culture turns out to be a major issue for socioeconomic terms for the following cf. Hummel a, b. The French word cadre was borrowed from Italian in the 16th century, which reflects the international prestige of Italian Renaissance. It soon got its basic meaning frame. Later on cadre passed to refer also to whole frameworks which support technical constructions and human organizations. This meaning of cadre follows historically the rise of big organizations. The first big organization of a modern type was Napoleon s army first use of cadre attested in , followed by public administration , political parties and big industrial companies The cadres formed the supporting structure and, thus, the elite.

The desire to pertain to the elite motivated the individual desire to belong to the cadres. This is the reason why cadre was used to refer to a single person also. This special meaning was the one which came to be associated with the actual mental prototype.

Note that the prototype of a cadre is eactly the same we find associated in German with Manager. In both cases, the prototype stems from the prestige of the economic model represented by the Unites States after World War II. Cadre was strongly connotated with the danger of Americanization in France.